Letter from Wing Commander R.G. Grocott, RAF (retired), to Dave Clarke, 28 July 2001
Wing Co. Grocott was a senior officer at Eastern Sector, RAF Bawburgh, 1956
"At about the time of this incident I was
probably en route to a new posting in Germany, but with the Suez
crisis brewing, the move was postponed and I was recalled to
Eastern Sector from embarkation leave.
"I do remember being on duty when a Venom lost its wing
tanks, [but] that incident was not followed by all the thrills
and excitement reported in your papers.
"At the time [August 1956] I was still in post at Eastern
Sector and fully cognizant with current operational procedures,
so feel qualified to make some general comments.
"Of all the accounts in your papers, only that by Freddie
Wimbledon strikes true. As he says, the story by the American
controller [Forrest Perkins] is almost pure fiction.
"Air Defence within the UK was, at that time, the sovereign
right and responsibility solely of British forces. As you
probably know, command and control were exercised at the highest
level by the Air Defence Operations Centre (ADOC) at Fighter
Command. Authority to scramble fighters for operational
interceptions (ie from QRA) was vested in the Sector Operations
Centres, with Eastern being located at Bawburgh. Sector might
have delegated authority to Neatishead (perhaps because the
former was not operational, or to a achieve a faster reaction
time), but Sector would have been kept fully in the picture. In
such an incident as this, ADOC and/or Sector would (or should)
also have been involved in any co-ordinated actions between the
RAF and USAF. It is unlikely that any USAF action at the level of
the '7th Air Division Command Post at [sic] London' would have
been taken without consulting either of these RAF authorities. It
would, I believe, also have been diplomatically improper. I
suggest, therefore, that your best sources for valid data on the
really important facts and conclusions for this incident should
be the higher staff levels (now Strike Command and the MOD).
Merely to question participants such as pilots and controllers so
long after the event would be to attempt your own very amateur
Board of Inquiry dependent upon probably distorted memories.
"Some comments: The radar in the vicinity of Lakenheath was
probably Langtoft [G.C.I. in Rutland] with similar equipment, and
subordinate to Neatishead. The appointment of the officer at
Sector with authority to scramble the QRA was Sector Controller,
not Commanding Officer. He would (or perhaps should) have been in
close liasion with the USAF, not by R/T but by landline. Although
from the papers you sent me there appears to have been little or
no such liaison.
"You say that official records relating to this incident
appear to have been either destroyed or misplaced. Not too much
should be read into this. Consider how much bumph would have to
be stored if all details from all such operational watches were
retained, and this incident occurred before the days of
computerised or digital storage.
"Not having been directly involved in the incident I can say
little in response to the questions in your letter except:
"1. The SOC and its staff operated from Bawburgh [near
Norwich]. Horsham St Faith provided only domestic facilities.
"2. Lakenheath was an offensive base. So far as I remember
no air-defence fighters were there: certainly none were used for
UK QRA duties. Any liaison with such bases would have been to
establish the identity of an unidentified track: perhaps one of
their aircraft not adhering to Flight Plan. Until 1955 the 1st
Canadian Fighter Wing (three sqaudrons of F-86 Sabres) was based
at North Luffenham, but they were an integral part of the UK air
defence system and used by QRA. They redeployed to Germany some
time during that year (1955), I can't remember when.
"As to USAF fighters being used for QRA: as I remember it,
none at Lakenheath, Bentwaters, Manston or elsewhere in the UK
were specifically tasked for QRA, though they may sometimes have
been used ad hoc for visual track identification. We had great
flexibility in filling our task and the Sector Controller, even
at times the Chief Controller at a GCI station, might call on any
available aircraft (whether already airborne or ready on the
ground) to assist in identifying a track, but control would
normally, though not invariably, remain with the RAF Air Defence
Control system."
"3. It is possible that the Venoms were told to contact the
USAF. Neatishead would normally have passed the order to do so.
But, as another report says, the Lakenheath controllers were
neither equipped nor trained for air defence control. One of the
aircrews makes this point, saying that they were merely told
where the target was rather than given instructions on how to
intercept.
"4. Though not directly involved, I cannot believe that, if
the incident was as significant as your papers suggest, I would
not have been aware of it. As to explanations for Unidentified
Flying Objects: Freddie Wimbledon has adequately covered the
problem of ANAPROP (anomalous propagation of radar waves),
ANGELS, etc. In my considerable experience of such operations,
from the UK through to Hong Kong, I have experience of
controlling fighters chasing balloons, and even flocks of birds.
"For my own part I have an open mind, but would need more
proof than the usual apparent assumption that because a track
remains unidentified it must be caused by what has so loosely
come to be called a UFO, which in turn is commonly and mistakenly
defined as something from 'outer space.'
"[During my time at Eastern Sector 1954-57] of course there
was cognizance of and interest in UFOs, they were essentially our
raison d'etre. But, any object appearing on our detection radars
was literally a UFO until identified by flight-plan etc. There
were some that were never satisfactorily identified, but this
must not be taken to mean that they were caused by phenomena from
other worlds."